Overall Trends
Total, fatal, and serious accidents in the selected range.
Search investigations, review source evidence, monitor watched reports, and trace long-term patterns from one calm, data-first workspace.
Fast key and full-text search with live filters, watches, and precise metadata.
Use quotes for exact phrase matches (for example "fuel selector valve").
Track fatal and non-fatal accident patterns across Part 91, Part 135, and Part 121 operations.
Major cases, deep-report coverage, and investigation media across decades of NTSB history.
Move quickly by aircraft, airport, operator, and time with indexes built for research, not wandering.
NTSB Reports is an independent research and search tool for public aviation accident and incident records. It brings NTSB aviation reports, structured fields, docket files, extracted figures, photos, videos, and update history into one searchable interface.
The goal is practical safety education: make it faster to find relevant investigations, compare similar events, review factual records, and understand the evidence behind probable-cause and preliminary reports.
The investigative work and source records belong to the National Transportation Safety Board and the published investigation record. This site is not affiliated with or endorsed by the NTSB.
Los Angeles, CA
On August 13, 2018, about 1645 Pacific daylight time, Hawaiian Airlines flight 56, an Airbus A321, N204HA, experienced a tail strike during landing at Los Angeles International Airport (KLAX), Los Angeles, California. There were no injuries to the 197 passengers and crew onboard. The airplane sustained substantial damage. The domestic passenger flight was operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 from Kahului Airport (PHOG), Kahului, Hawaii, to KLAX. The first officer (FO) was the pilot flying and the captain was the pilot monitoring. According to the flight crew, they received a GPWS Fail message on the electronic centralized alert monitoring (ECAM) at about 1,500 feet altitude above the ground (agl) after the airplane was established on the ILS 6R approach. The flight crew conducted the appropriate ECAM actions, which only required them to turn off the ground proximity warning system (GPWS) and continued the approach. As the airplane descended through about 50 feet agl, the FO realized the electronic automatic altitude callouts were not being provided by the airplane system but did not have time to react. The airplane touched down firmly, bounced, and the pitch attitude increased before it was arrested by the FO, resulting in the tail section contacting the runway. Post flight examination of the airplane found damage to the aft lower skin, as well as several deformed stringers, tie clips, and frames. During the approach, the crew did not receive any automated altitude callouts that are determined by the radio altimeter (RA). The crew only received the “100 above” and “minimums” callouts, both of which are based on barometric altitude. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed with light winds at the time of the approach resulting in the airplane descending over calm water. In February 2018 (updated on August 6, 2018) the manufacturer released a Flight Operations Transmission (FOT) and an Operations Engineering Bulletin in July 2018 referencing “No RA Available During Approach Over Water”. The FOT indicated that a new RA had abnormal behavior if the airplane approach is over a flat-water area and may not be available. Subsequent to the accident, the operator issued a Memorandum to Pilots that described the circumstances of the accident and the FOT and issued an Operations Engineering Bulletin, which detailed the required procedures if no RA is available.
a tailstrike caused by inappropriate recovery technique after a bounced landing. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the radio altimeter, caused by the approach being over calm/flat water, that was not recognized by the flight crew.
On August 13, 2018, about 1645 pacific daylight time, Hawaiian Airlines flight 56, an Airbus A321, N204HA, experienced a tail strike during landing at Los Angeles International Airport (KLAX), Los Angeles, California. There were no injuries to the 197 passengers and crew onboard. The airplane sustained substantial damage. The domestic passenger flight was operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 from Kahului Airport (PHOG), Kahului, Hawaii, to KLAX. The first officer (FO) was the pilot flying and the captain was the pilot monitoring. According to the flight crew, they received a GPWS Fail message on the electronic centralized alert monitoring (ECAM) at about 1,500 feet altitude above the ground (agl) after the airplane was established on the ILS 6R approach. The flight crew conducted the appropriate ECAM actions, which only required them to turn off the ground proximity warning system (GPWS) and continued the approach. As the airplane descended through about 50 feet agl, the FO realized the electronic automatic altitude callouts were not being provided by the airplane system but did not have time to react. The airplane touched down firmly, bounced, and the pitch attitude increased before it was arrested by the FO, resulting in the tail section contacting the runway. Post flight examination of the airplane found damage to the aft lower skin, as well as several deformed stringers, tie clips, and frames. During the approach, the crew did not receive any automated altitude callouts that are determined by the radio altimeter (RA). The crew only received the “100 above” and “minimums” callouts, both of which are based on barometric altitude. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed with light winds at the time of the approach resulting in the airplane descending over calm water. In February 2018 (updated on August 6, 2018) the manufacturer released a Flight Operations Transmission (FOT) and an Operations Engineering Bulletin in July 2018 referencing “No RA Available During Approach Over Water”. The FOT indicated that a new RA had abnormal behavior if the airplane approach is over a flat-water area and may not be available. Subsequent to the accident, the operator issued a Memorandum to Pilots that described the circumstances of the accident and the FOT and issued an Operations Engineering Bulletin, which detailed the required procedures if no RA is available.