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October 15, 2019 · Airbus BD-500-1A11 (CS300) No Series · HB-JCC

West Flanders Province, OF, BE

Overview

Report Status
Probable Cause
Event Type
Incident
Date
October 15, 2019
Location
West Flanders Province, OF, BE
Aircraft
Airbus BD-500-1A11 (CS300) No Series (2017)
Tail Number
HB-JCC
Operator
Swiss International Air Lines
Aircraft Damage
Minor
NTSB Number
ENG20LA001

The No. 1 engine low pressure compressor (LPC) stage 1 integrally bladed rotor (IBR) failure was caused by a stage 1 IBR high cycle fatigue crack that originated at the runout of an airfoil leading edge root radius. Multiple analytical methods, including two-dimensional (2D) computational fluid dynamics (CFD), acoustic testing, and instrumented flight testing identified a coupled LPC stage 3 and stage 1 IBR instability caused by an acoustic coincidence with the 2.5 bleed valve duct cavity. At high engine N1 speeds, the stage 3 IBR blade tips generate vortices/turbulent airflow and given the right conditions, the turbulent airflow can create an acoustic tone as it passes over the 2.5 bleed valve duct cavity, located immediately aft of the LPC stage 3 IBR (Figure 1). The acoustic tone drove a LPC stage 3 IBR blade 1st bending mode excitation that was then mechanically transferred through the LPC module and excited a LPC stage 1 IBR stiffwise bending mode that was present at the same approximate frequency. The resultant stresses on the LPC stage 1 IBR blades exceeded material limits and subsequently led to crack formation and eventual progression to overload failure. Figure 1- Engine LPC Diagram Identifying the IBR 3 / 2.5 Bleed Valve Acoustic Interaction Factors that contributed to the LPC stage 3 and stage 1 IBR acoustic coincidence and blade excitation within the engine operating range were: installation of electronic engine control (EEC) Software V2.11.7.2 and the low time rub in period on the LPC IBR blade tip clearances. EEC Software V2.11.7.2 changed the LPC inlet guide vane schedule to rotate the IGV’s in the closed direction at specific high power engine conditions to improve engine stall/surge margin. The revised vane schedule inadvertently created conditions that were favorable for generation of the 2.5 bleed valve duct cavity acoustic tone and IBR mode excitation. New engines have tighter clearances between the LPC IBR blade tips and the outer air seals. The reduced clearance created unsteady loading at the blade tip region and resulted in stronger acoustic coupling/flutter response. After a rub in period, the clearance increases, and the occurrence of flutter onset is reduced. There were three PW1524G-3 and one PW1521G-3 LPC stage 1 IBR separation events between July 25, 2019 and February 12, 2020 that occurred on multiple operators. The incident detailed in this investigation was the third PW1500G series LPC stage 1 IBR failure. The engine parameters at the time of each of the events and the resulting engine damage were consistent. Additional information about the failure mode and investigation process are available in the investigation dockets for the first two incidents, NTSB investigation numbers ENG19IA029 and ENG19IA034.

NTSB Probable Cause

A No. 1 (left) engine low pressure compressor (LPC) stage 1 integrally bladed rotor (IBR) separation due to a high cycle fatigue crack (HCF) that originated at the runout of an airfoil leading edge root radius. The HCF crack developed because of a mechanically coupled LPC stage 3 and stage 1 IBR mode excitation and blade flutter response. The excitation was driven by an acoustic tone generated by turbulent airflow passing over the 2.5 bleed valve duct cavity while the engine was operating at high speeds in specific flight conditions. A primary contributor to the failure mode was an electronic engine control (EEC) software update that changed the LPC vane schedule and increased the likelihood of LPC stage 1 IBR blade flutter onset within the engine operating range.

Full Narrative

The No. 1 engine low pressure compressor (LPC) stage 1 integrally bladed rotor (IBR) failure was caused by a stage 1 IBR high cycle fatigue crack that originated at the runout of an airfoil leading edge root radius. Multiple analytical methods, including two-dimensional (2D) computational fluid dynamics (CFD), acoustic testing, and instrumented flight testing identified a coupled LPC stage 3 and stage 1 IBR instability caused by an acoustic coincidence with the 2.5 bleed valve duct cavity. At high engine N1 speeds, the stage 3 IBR blade tips generate vortices/turbulent airflow and given the right conditions, the turbulent airflow can create an acoustic tone as it passes over the 2.5 bleed valve duct cavity, located immediately aft of the LPC stage 3 IBR (Figure 1). The acoustic tone drove a LPC stage 3 IBR blade 1st bending mode excitation that was then mechanically transferred through the LPC module and excited a LPC stage 1 IBR stiffwise bending mode that was present at the same approximate frequency. The resultant stresses on the LPC stage 1 IBR blades exceeded material limits and subsequently led to crack formation and eventual progression to overload failure. Figure 1- Engine LPC Diagram Identifying the IBR 3 / 2.5 Bleed Valve Acoustic Interaction Factors that contributed to the LPC stage 3 and stage 1 IBR acoustic coincidence and blade excitation within the engine operating range were: installation of electronic engine control (EEC) Software V2.11.7.2 and the low time rub in period on the LPC IBR blade tip clearances. EEC Software V2.11.7.2 changed the LPC inlet guide vane schedule to rotate the IGV’s in the closed direction at specific high power engine conditions to improve engine stall/surge margin. The revised vane schedule inadvertently created conditions that were favorable for generation of the 2.5 bleed valve duct cavity acoustic tone and IBR mode excitation. New engines have tighter clearances between the LPC IBR blade tips and the outer air seals. The reduced clearance created unsteady loading at the blade tip region and resulted in stronger acoustic coupling/flutter response. After a rub in period, the clearance increases, and the occurrence of flutter onset is reduced. There were three PW1524G-3 and one PW1521G-3 LPC stage 1 IBR separation events between July 25, 2019 and February 12, 2020 that occurred on multiple operators. The incident detailed in this investigation was the third PW1500G series LPC stage 1 IBR failure. The engine parameters at the time of each of the events and the resulting engine damage were consistent. Additional information about the failure mode and investigation process are available in the investigation dockets for the first two incidents, NTSB investigation numbers ENG19IA029 and ENG19IA034.

Flight

Event TypeIncident
Event Time06:40 UTC
Nearest Airport0nm
Aircraft FireNo
Aircraft ExplosionNo

Aircraft

AircraftAirbus BD-500-1A11 (CS300) No Series
Tail NumberHB-JCC
Aircraft CategoryAir
DamageMinor
OperatorSwiss International Air Lines
Engines2
Engine TypeTurbofan
Engine DetailsPratt & Whitney · PW1524G-3 · Turbofan · 24400 | Pratt & Whitney · PW1524G-3 · Turbofan · 24400

People & Injuries

Fatal0
Serious0
Minor0
Uninjured0
Total0

Conditions

ConditionsUnknown
LightDawn
WindCalm
CeilingNone
Temperature / Dew Point0 C / 0 C
Altimeter0

Appendix: Source Data