Overall Trends
Total, fatal, and serious accidents in the selected range.
Search investigations, review source evidence, monitor watched reports, and trace long-term patterns from one calm, data-first workspace.
Fast key and full-text search with live filters, watches, and precise metadata.
Use quotes for exact phrase matches (for example "fuel selector valve").
Track fatal and non-fatal accident patterns across Part 91, Part 135, and Part 121 operations.
Major cases, deep-report coverage, and investigation media across decades of NTSB history.
Move quickly by aircraft, airport, operator, and time with indexes built for research, not wandering.
NTSB Reports is an independent research and search tool for public aviation accident and incident records. It brings NTSB aviation reports, structured fields, docket files, extracted figures, photos, videos, and update history into one searchable interface.
The goal is practical safety education: make it faster to find relevant investigations, compare similar events, review factual records, and understand the evidence behind probable-cause and preliminary reports.
The investigative work and source records belong to the National Transportation Safety Board and the published investigation record. This site is not affiliated with or endorsed by the NTSB.
Tampa, FL
The pilot and flight instructor were practicing straight-in, full touch down power off landings (autorotations) in the helicopter at night, with the aid of night vision goggles (NVGs). The pilot determined where on the runway he was going to land and entered the autorotation at an approximate airspeed of 60 knots. When the helicopter was about 90 to 100 ft above the ground, and the engine rpm was at 99-100%, he entered the flare. At the bottom of the flare, the pilot “bumped” up the collective to arrest the rate of descent and leveled out at what he thought was about 7-10 ft above the runway. At that point, the pilot said it felt like the bottom of the helicopter started to fall out from underneath him. He added more collective to arrest the sink rate, but it had no impact on stopping the vertical sink rate. The low rotor rpm horn sounded right before the helicopter landed hard on the runway. The impact was sufficient to flex the main rotor blades and sever the tail boom. The main rotor blades were also substantially damaged. The operator reported there were no mechanical deficiencies of the helicopter that contributed to the accident. The runway had been recently paved and was very dark in color. The pilot had conducted “hundreds” of NVG power off landings to this runway in the past, but this was his first time after the runway had been re-paved. This was the flight instructor’s first time executing a practice NVG power off landing to this runway. As such, the visual cues that the pilot was used to experiencing had changed, and most likely affected his ability to judge the helicopter’s height and speed above the ground, which resulted in a higher-than-normal flair, low rotor rpm, and subsequent hard landing.
The pilot’s improper landing flare while making a power off practice autorotative landing. Contributing was the decreased visual cues provided by the recently paved runway during the night landing conducted with the aid of night vision goggles.
The pilot and flight instructor were practicing straight-in, full touch down power off landings (autorotations) in the helicopter at night, with the aid of night vision goggles (NVGs). The pilot determined where on the runway he was going to land and entered the autorotation at an approximate airspeed of 60 knots. When the helicopter was about 90 to 100 ft above the ground, and the engine rpm was at 99-100%, he entered the flare. At the bottom of the flare, the pilot “bumped” up the collective to arrest the rate of descent and leveled out at what he thought was about 7-10 ft above the runway. At that point, the pilot said it felt like the bottom of the helicopter started to fall out from underneath him. He added more collective to arrest the sink rate, but it had no impact on stopping the vertical sink rate. The low rotor rpm horn sounded right before the helicopter landed hard on the runway. The impact was sufficient to flex the main rotor blades and sever the tail boom. The main rotor blades were also substantially damaged. . The operator reported there were no mechanical deficiencies of the helicopter that contributed to the accident. The runway had been recently paved and was very dark in color. The pilot had conducted “hundreds” of NVG power off landings to this runway in the past, but this was his first time after the runway had been re-paved. This was the flight instructor’s first time executing a practice NVG power off landing to this runway. As such, the visual cues that the pilot was used to experiencing had changed, and most likely affected his ability to judge the helicopter’s height and speed above the ground, which resulted in a higher-than-normal flair, low rotor rpm, and subsequent hard landing.