The flight was being operated as a corporate flight with a two-person crew. The captain was the pilot flying (PF) and stated that while on final approach, the airplane was “eating up a lot of runway” before it settled on the runway. He applied full brakes and activated the thrust reversers, but it was not enough to stop the airplane and it subsequently entered the Engineered Material Arresting System (EMAS), which resulted in substantial damage to the pressure vessel. He admitted that he became fixated on landing, failed to take proper remedial actions, and thought he could salvage the approach despite the pilot monitoring’s (PM) repeated go-around commands. The PM stated that about 2 nautical miles from the runway threshold, the airplane’s descent rate increased, which activated the ground proximity warning “Terrain, Pull Up.” The PM commanded a “go-around” which was not acknowledged by the PF who continued the approach. When the airplane was on a 1-mile final, the PM called for a “go-around” a second time, followed by third as they crossed the runway threshold about 30 to 40 knots too fast. The captain reported that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.