Overall Trends
Total, fatal, and serious accidents in the selected range.
Search investigations, review source evidence, monitor watched reports, and trace long-term patterns from one calm, data-first workspace.
Fast key and full-text search with live filters, watches, and precise metadata.
Use quotes for exact phrase matches (for example "fuel selector valve").
Track fatal and non-fatal accident patterns across Part 91, Part 135, and Part 121 operations.
Major cases, deep-report coverage, and investigation media across decades of NTSB history.
Move quickly by aircraft, airport, operator, and time with indexes built for research, not wandering.
NTSB Reports is an independent research and search tool for public aviation accident and incident records. It brings NTSB aviation reports, structured fields, docket files, extracted figures, photos, videos, and update history into one searchable interface.
The goal is practical safety education: make it faster to find relevant investigations, compare similar events, review factual records, and understand the evidence behind probable-cause and preliminary reports.
The investigative work and source records belong to the National Transportation Safety Board and the published investigation record. This site is not affiliated with or endorsed by the NTSB.
De Kalb, TX
The flight was conducted to hunt feral hogs. The pilot reported that a group of hogs had entered a large field, and he lowered the collective to maneuver the helicopter closer. When he lowered the collective, he perceived a loss of engine and rotor speed. The helicopter immediately began to lose lift. Once the pilot realized that he could not recover the helicopter, he attempted a running (skid-on) landing. However, the landing skids got stuck in the muddy field, the helicopter rocked forward, and the main rotor blades struck the ground causing the aircraft to roll over. The pilot reported the low rotor speed warning did not activate when the rotor speed started to decay. He also stated that all required preflight checklists were complied with before the flight began and no anomalies were noted. A postrecovery examination was unremarkable with exception of the low rotor warning system, which was not operational at the time of the examination. Specifically, the warning system did not activate when the collective control was brought off the low pitch stop and increased to full travel. The reason for the failure of the low rotor warning system was not determined.
The pilot’s inability to maintain control of the helicopter due to his failure to maintain rotor speed. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the helicopter’s low rotor speed warning system.
On March 11, 2023, about 1530 central standard time, a Robinson Helicopter R-44, N4164T, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near De Kalb, Texas. The pilot and one passenger were not injured, a second passenger sustained minor injuries, and a third passenger was seriously injured. The helicopter was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 aerial observation flight. The flight was conducted to hunt feral hogs. The pilot reported that a group of hogs had entered a large field, and he lowered the collective to maneuver the helicopter closer. When he lowered the collective, he perceived a loss of engine and rotor speed. The helicopter immediately began to lose lift. Once the pilot realized that he could not recover the helicopter, he attempted a running (skid-on) landing. However, the landing skids got stuck in the muddy field, the helicopter rocked forward, and the main rotor blades struck the ground causing the aircraft to roll over. The pilot reported the low rotor speed warning did not activate when the rotor speed started to decay. He also stated that all required preflight checklists were complied with before the flight began and no anomalies were noted. The helicopter sustained damage to the fuselage, main rotor blades, and tail boom. The aft portion of the tail boom, with the tail rotor assembly attached, was separated from the remainder of the airframe. It was located adjacent to the fuselage at the accident site. Postrecovery airframe and engine examinations, which included an 8-minute engine run, did not reveal any evidence of an in-flight structural failure, a flight control malfunction, or an inability of the engine to produce rated power. Although, the separated portion of the tail boom and tail rotor assembly were present at the accident site, they were not with the wreckage when recovered. The postrecovery examinations were unremarkable with exception of the low rotor warning system, which was not operational at the time of the examination. Specifically, the warning system did not activate when the collective control was brought off the low pitch stop and increased to full travel. The low rotor warning indicator bulb illuminated, and the warning horn emitted an audible sound when electrical current was applied. The reason for the failure of the low rotor warning system was not determined.