On January 28, 2024, about 1623 eastern standard time, a Honda Aircraft Company LLC HA-420 airplane, N103JT, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident at Orlando International Airport (MCO), Orlando, Florida. The airline transport pilot, commercial co-pilot, and two passengers were not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 on-demand passenger flight. The left-seat pilot was the PF. According to the CVR recording, about 1 hour 22 minutes before landing, about 1501, the flight crew reviewed the MCO ATIS, which indicated the wind was from 270° at 14 kts, gusting to 24 kts. The CVR recorded the crew discussing the crosswind component associated with the reported winds, the airplane’s operating limitations, and company procedures. They noted that a runway at a nearby airport, Orlando Executive Airport (ORL), was more aligned with the reported wind direction. The PM asked the passengers whether they had a car waiting for them at MCO, and commented to the PF about arranging transportation for the passengers from ORL to MCO. About 1556, the crew obtained ATIS information Victor for MCO that reported the wind from 260° at 16 kts, gusting to 23 kts. The airplane continued toward MCO. About 1607, when the airplane was about 39 nm northwest of MCO, the crew discussed wind information from the ASOS at MCO. The PF stated that he checked the ASOS four times in the prior 20 minutes and only one report mentioned gusts. He added that the wind speed was reported to be 13 to 14 kts and the wind currently was from 270° at 13 kts. The PF also said they would ask for a wind check when the airplane was on final approach. The airplane continued into the downwind, base, and final approach legs of the airport traffic pattern. At 1619:57, a crew member contacted the MCO air traffic control tower and advised the controller that the airplane was 2 miles from the final approach fix for runway 36L. The controller advised the crew that the wind was from 290° at 21 kts and cleared the airplane to land; the CVR recorded the crew calculating a crosswind component of 19 kts. At 1622:06, when the flight was 1.2 nm from the approach end of runway 36L, a crew member of another airplane requested a wind check and the controller advised 290° at 19 kts, “…now gusting two four.” The CVR recorded both crew members of the accident airplane state that the calculated crosswind component was 19 kts. Figure 1 shows the wind data referenced by the crew before touchdown. Figure 1. Wind data referenced by the crew before touchdown The PF continued the approach to runway 36L with a wind recorded on the flight data recorder from 286° true at 19 kts, although there was no recorded parameter for wind gusts. At about the time the airplane touched down, which occurred at 1622:54, the controller broadcast on the frequency for another airplane that was on a visual approach to runway 36L that the wind was from 290° at 20 kts with gusts of 24 kts. After the accident airplane touched down, the PF applied left aileron control input to counter the crosswind and deployed the speedbrake. The airplane began drifting left, which the PF attempted to correct with right rudder input but with no effect. The airplane departed the left side of the runway surface, rolled onto the grass, and about 1623 impacted a runway distance remaining sign. The PF was then able to correct to the right, travel back onto the runway, and then taxi off the runway at taxiway E where he stopped the airplane. The airplane was secured and then evacuated. The controller asked the crew if they experienced a flat tire, and a crew member responded, “Negative, we’re not sure, it could have been a gust, but uh we’re not sure.” The rudder position for the crosswind approach and when the nose landing gear contacted the runway could not be determined because weight-on-wheels and rudder input were not recorded parameters on the flight data recorder. The operator reported there were no mechanical irregularities with the airplane during the flight and landing. The airplane flight manual (AFM) specified the crosswind limitation for the accident airplane as 20 kts. The operator’s flight operations training guidance to crews related to crosswind landings indicated that “gust limits” are not discussed in the AFM and are assumed to be 20 kts as well. The guidance further provided charts for documenting the crosswind and wind gust components based on runway width. Using the wind component chart, based on the reported steady-state wind being 70° from the runway heading to the left at 20 kts, the crosswind component was 19 kts. Using the same guidance, the gust crosswind component was calculated to be about 23 kts. Utilizing the same training document and the runway width of 100 ft, which was the maximum runway width specified on the chart, the maximum acceptable crosswind and gust components were each 20 kts. Verbiage on the document specified that if the provided wind from a “wind check” was beyond the crosswind limits, “You must wait for the next wind check.” Postaccident, the operator developed “Go/No-Go winds criteria” that specified, “If any authorized weather report for a flight shows that, within the estimated time of arrival, the crosswind component will be out of the below limits,” then “…the flight shall NOT proceed to that destination airport.” Postaccident examination of the airplane by an FAA inspector and a representative of the airplane manufacturer revealed no evidence of any failures or malfunctions of the primary or secondary flight controls. The rudder and aileron trims were observed in the neutral position. The airplane manufacturer reported that the left wing’s forward spar exhibited cracks and deformation; that damage was substantial. Although all tires exhibited scuffing, none were deflated. Review of the impacted runway distance remaining sign revealed that all three aluminum posts were frangible incorporating a reduced circumference area. The center and western mounted posts did not fracture at the reduced circumference area but the corresponding mounts were fractured, while the eastern mount was not fractured but the post was fractured at the reduced circumference area. The 5-minute ASOS weather observations at MCO between 1500 and 1605 were reviewed. The last of these observations was about 2 minutes after the PF advised that he checked the ASOS and reported the wind was from 270° at 13 kts there was one observation in which the wind direction and steady state wind velocity partially matched the PF’s comments. That observation occurred at 1600, within the time frame specified by the PF; that observation also reported that gusts were at 24 kts, which the PF did not state. Additionally, wind gusts were reported in all but 2 of the 14 observations. Figure 2 shows the ASOS observations between 1500 and when the airplane touched down. Figure 2. ASOS observations between 1500 and when the airplane touched down.