The pilot and his passenger were preparing for a cross-country flight. After a routine preflight inspection and engine start, the pilot taxied to runway 27, which was 2,644 ft-long and comprised of turf. The grass was “mid height” and wet from the morning dew. The pilot commonly used a “hump” in the runway as a go/no-go decision point, which was about midfield. During the takeoff roll, he scanned his tablet device for speed and noted 47 knots; 52 knots was stall speed, configured. As the takeoff roll continued, he tried to “pop” the airplane off the ground and into ground effect; this attempt was unsuccessful. He realized that the airplane would not become airborne and it departed the end of the runway, collided with a berm, and spun around to a stop. A postaccident fire ensued and the pilot and passenger egressed the airplane without injuries. Despite attempts to extinguish the fire, it progressed and eventually consumed the fuselage. An inspector with the Federal Aviation Administration reported that the airplane was destroyed. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. He also reported that performing the “no go” decision at the hump in the runway would have prevented the accident.