Overall Trends
Total, fatal, and serious accidents in the selected range.
Search investigations, review source evidence, monitor watched reports, and trace long-term patterns from one calm, data-first workspace.
Fast key and full-text search with live filters, watches, and precise metadata.
Use quotes for exact phrase matches (for example "fuel selector valve").
Track fatal and non-fatal accident patterns across Part 91, Part 135, and Part 121 operations.
Major cases, deep-report coverage, and investigation media across decades of NTSB history.
Move quickly by aircraft, airport, operator, and time with indexes built for research, not wandering.
NTSB Reports is an independent research and search tool for public aviation accident and incident records. It brings NTSB aviation reports, structured fields, docket files, extracted figures, photos, videos, and update history into one searchable interface.
The goal is practical safety education: make it faster to find relevant investigations, compare similar events, review factual records, and understand the evidence behind probable-cause and preliminary reports.
The investigative work and source records belong to the National Transportation Safety Board and the published investigation record. This site is not affiliated with or endorsed by the NTSB.
Washington, NC
The business jet landed on the runway at the completion of a visual approach with the landing gear retracted. The airplane slid to a stop, and a post-crash fire ensued which resulted in the airplane sustaining substantial damage. The two pilots, the sole occupants, egressed the airplane successfully without injury. In probably should state where the ground injury occurred. In telephone interviews and written statements, the pilots each stated that there were no mechanical deficiencies with the airplane that would have precluded deployment of the landing gear and a successful landing. The first officer further stated that the gear warning was only audible in the left seat (Captain’s) headset and was not heard in her headset (right seat) or the overhead speaker, and that the communications panel had a “history” of problems. Review of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) confirmed the limitations of the airplane’s communication system, that the crew was aware of them, and that they discussed and debated how to mitigate the system’s limitations. The review also revealed that during the flights on the day of the accident, the performance of Before-Starting-Engines, Engine Start, Before Taxi, Before Takeoff, Before Landing and other tasks did not comport with the manufacturer’s checklists and were sometimes performed without any verbal communication between crewmembers. The CVR recording further revealed that the captain removed his headset due to a 500Hz “squeal” that he failed to identify as the gear warning horn, and consequently missed the repeating, “too low, gear” aural warning that followed.
The flight crew’s failure to properly configure the airplane before landing and the captain’s subsequent failure to recognize the landing gear aural warning, which resulted in a gear-up landing. Contributing to the accident was the flight crew’s inadequate checklist use and crew coordination, and the known diminished capability of the airplane’s communication system.
The business jet landed on the runway at the completion of a visual approach with the landing gear retracted. The airplane slid to a stop, and a post-crash fire ensued which resulted in the airplane sustaining substantial damage. The two pilots, the sole occupants, egressed the airplane successfully without injury. InProbably should state where the ground injury occurred. telephone interviews and written statements, the pilots each stated that there were no mechanical deficiencies with the airplane that would have precluded deployment of the landing gear and a successful landing. The first officer further stated that the gear warning was only audible in the left seat (Captain’s) headset and was not heard in her headset (right seat) or the overhead speaker, and that the communications panel had a “history” of problems. Review of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) confirmed the limitations of the airplane’s communication system, that the crew was aware of them, and that they discussed and debated how to mitigate the system’s limitations. The review also revealed that during the flights on the day of the accident, the performance of Before-Starting-Engines, Engine Start, Before Taxi, Before Takeoff, Before Landing and other tasks did not comport with the manufacturer’s checklists and were sometimes performed without any verbal communication between crewmembers. The CVR recording further revealed that the captain removed his headset due to a 500Hz “squeal” that he failed to identify as the gear warning horn, and consequently missed the repeating, “too low, gear” aural warning that followed.