HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn September 16, 2024, at 0946 Pacific daylight time, a Globe Swift GC-1B (Swift) airplane, N78074, and a Textron Aviation Cessna T206H Station Air (Cessna) airplane, N844CP, were substantially damaged when they were involved in an accident near the Minden-Tahoe Airport (MEV), Minden, Nevada. The Swift pilot was fatally injured, and the Cessna pilot and instructor pilot were not injured. The Swift was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. The Cessna was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 instructional flight. The left-seated pilot of the Cessna, who was acting as the pilot flying, stated that the purpose of the flight was to perform a Form 5 flight, which was an annual check ride where he demonstrated fundamental flight maneuvers (for example, an instrument approach and coordinated turns). After maneuvering south of the airport, he performed the RNAV 34 instrument approach and overflew the airport on the missed approach; at no time was he using any form of vision restriction device. The pilot then entered the traffic pattern for a short-field landing on Runway 34, making radio announcements about his intentions. After the short-field landing, the pilot executed a touch-and-go. He transitioned to the crosswind at 5,300 feet mean sea level (msl) and continued climbing to the downwind leg, where he planned to ascend to the traffic pattern altitude of 5,700 feet msl. While reviewing his flight track the pilot estimated that at 0946:37 he heard a radio call from another airplane that stated they were on a 45° intercept for the downwind leg for runway 34. At that time, both he and the right-seated instructor pilot began scanning for traffic outside but could not locate the other airplane. The pilot asked the instructor pilot to check his iPad for ADS-B traffic, but the instructor pilot was not able to locate any airplanes. The pilot stated he was making a radio call of his position while on the downwind leg when the airplane impacted the Swift. He never observed the other airplane and instead believed that the engine experienced a catastrophic failure. The windscreen became covered in oil and the nose cowling flew upward and was pinned against the windscreen, only allowing visibility through the oil door. The instructor pilot assumed the flight controls and made an emergency landing on runway 12. The pilot emphasized that the pattern they flew was normal, and both he and the instructor pilot were actively scanning outside the airplane. The pilot recalled that the weather conditions were overcast at 8,000 ft msl but clear below, with no glare or visibility issues. The Cessna was equipped with a Garmin G1000 that recorded trip parameters on an SD card. The recorded data disclosed that the Cessna departed Minden about 0908. After takeoff, the airplane executed several maneuvers south of the airport before returning and overflying runway 34 about 0941 (while at an altitude of 5,700 ft msl). The airplane entered the crosswind leg of the traffic pattern about 1 nautical mile north of the approach end of runway 16 and turned left onto the downwind leg at 5,825 ft msl, flying directly above US-395. After touching down on the runway, the airplane took off again at 0945:20. The airplane turned crosswind about 0.4 nautical miles north of the approach end of runway 16 at 0946:25 at an altitude of 5,225 ft msl. The ADS-B data shows the airplane then making a left turn and descending to runway 12 (see figure 1). Figure 1. Cessna ADS-B and G1000 tracks. A friend of the Swift pilot stated that the pilot sent him a text about 0925 on the morning of the accident stating that he was preparing to move his airplane from the Pinenut Airport (NV55), Gardnerville, Nevada, to MEV. The pilot explained that he wanted to move the Swift before an incoming storm to avoid a potentially muddy airstrip before their upcoming fly-in in Jackson, California. The friend was waiting for the pilot at MEV and planning to drive him back to Gardnerville. The friend further stated that he knew the pilot well and had purchased his own Swift airplane from the pilot. He described the pilot as being meticulous and that he consistently followed the same routines during flights. He described the pilot’s typical flight path from NV55 to MEV, which involved flying west initially, then north along the mountain range. As the airplane neared the waterski pools, the pilot would make a radio call to enter the 45° angle to intercept the downwind leg for runway 34. The pilot would fly this interception, crossing over US-395, and then join the downwind with a close-in traffic pattern. The friend emphasized that the pilot was diligent about listening for traffic and maintaining a constant lookout for other aircraft in the area. The Swift was not equipped with ADS-B , nor was it required, and no radar data was available at the time of this report. The pilot often flew the friend's GC-1B Swift airplane that was equipped with ADS-B (wired to the navigation lights) and a higher-horsepower engine than the accident Swift. Investigators located several flight tracks that were attributed to when the pilot was flying, one of which occurred on July 20, 2024, and originated from NV55 and terminated at MEV (see figure 2). The friend confirmed that this was the pilot’s normal pattern and that the pilot was flying the airplane at the time of this recorded flight track. It is presumed that the prior approximately 15-minute flight was similar to the accident flight path. Figure 2. Swift pilot’s prior traffic pattern to runway 34. Numerous cameras captured low-quality footage of the airplanes’ movements leading up to the impact. An airport security camera showed the Cessna on crosswind in a gradual ascent and the Swift arriving from Jack’s Valley, northwest of MEV (see figure 3). A dashcam video from a driver heading north on US-395 showed the Swift crossing from the west over the freeway (heading eastward) and at a slightly higher altitude than the Cessna just prior to impact (see figure 4). After impact, the Swift can be seen erupting in flames and falling nearly vertically to the fields below. The investigation could not definitively determine if the Swift made an evasive maneuver before the impact or if either airplane had the navigation and strobe lights operating. Figure 3. Composite footage from a northwest-facing airport security camera showing the impact. Figure 4. Clips of dashcam footage showing the seconds before and after the impact. Comparing the Cessna flight track and the prior Swift flight track showed that the paths intersected near the location where the videos indicate the airplanes collided (see figure 5). Figure 5. Comparison of the Cessna’s accident flight track and the Swift pilot’s prior flight. The non-towered airport recorded the Common Traffic Advisory Frequency transmissions. A review of the recordings revealed that 11 minutes before the accident, the left-seated pilot of the Cessna transmitted that they were 10 miles from the airport, intending to perform touch-and-go practice takeoffs and landings. Shortly thereafter, he reported overflying the runway and entering the downwind leg of the traffic pattern for runway 34. His subsequent transmissions provided position reports as the airplane proceeded through the pattern. He first reported that the airplane was on the downwind leg, then on the base leg, and finally, at 09:44:14, he announced they were on final approach for runway 34. At 09:46:36, the Swift pilot reported being on a 45° intercept to the downwind leg for runway 34. Ten seconds later, the Cessna pilot transmitted that they were on a “crosswind to left—” The investigation presumes that the two airplanes collided during this transmission, with the impact occurring at 09:46:53. At 09:48:02, the Cessna pilot reported being on the runway, indicating a loss of engine power. Twenty-eight seconds later, the right-seated pilot of the Cessna made a radio call stating they had been involved in a midair collision and requesting the dispatch of medical and fire services. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe main wreckage of the Swift was located about 1 nautical mile from the approach end of runway 16 and came to rest on a heading of 290°. The wreckage sustained significant fire damage, primarily to the cockpit and inboard wings where the fuel tanks were located. The Swift’s main landing gear was found in the retracted position. The remaining wing and fuselage skin did not show evidence of impact damage from the collision with the Cessna. The Swift’s propeller remained attached to the engine and was undamaged. The Swift’s main tail section was located about 450 ft from the main wreckage. The tail section was missing the bottom tail cone, the outboard right elevator, horizontal stabilizer, and rudder, all of which were found nearby in the debris field. The debris field extended about 1,025 ft and contained intermingled components from both airplanes. Numerous Swift skin fragments were scattered throughout the debris field, with most of those fragments originating from the lower tail section. Several debris items were coated with red hydraulic oil consistent with the fluid in the Cessna propeller hub. The Cessna sustained damage to the forward engine, propeller, cowling, firewall, and engine mount areas. One Cessna propeller blade separated from the hub. The main portion of the separated propeller blade was found in the debris field, and an 8-inch blade tip section was lodged in the Cessna’s firewall area. The Cessna’s engine was canted to the right due to fractured mounts. The Swift’s tailwheel and portions of its mounting structure were lodged entirely underneath the Cessna engine. The Cessna front right engine mount had separated from the airframe and was found near the Swift’s tailwheel, having punctured the tunnel. TESTS AND RESEARCHMidair Collision Geometry The Cessna’s recorded Garmin G1000 data provided the most reliable information because the Swift’s accident flight heading and speed were not recorded. The Swift’s probable flight path was therefore inferred from the pilot’s prior June 20, 2024, ADS-B flight tracks in another Swift, the friend’s description of the pilot’s normal arrival route, the Common Traffic Advisory Frequency transmission, and video evidence. The prior Swift tracks and the Cessna’s final recorded track intersected near the collision location shown in the video and reconstruction imagery. Just prior to the impact, the Cessna’s recorded heading was about 251° and its final recorded ground track was about 255°. The prior Swift track and video evidence were consistent with the Swift approaching from the northwest/west on a southeast-bound 45° intercept toward the left downwind leg for runway 34. The July 20 prior Swift track segment near the probable intercept area showed a southeast-bound course of about 145° to 170°. The tailwheel-to-engine contact was consistent with the Cessna climbing into the Swift from below and aft. The dashcam video showed the Swift slightly above the Cessna immediately before impact. The contact relationship was consistent with damage to the Cessna propeller, engine mount, firewall, and cowling, and with separation and fragmentation of the Swift’s aft lower tail section. The available evidence did not permit a precise vertical convergence angle to be calculated. Visibility The Cessna pilots heard the Swift pilot’s 45° entry call about 17 seconds before the presumed impact time. Both Cessna pilots reported searching outside for the traffic. The right-seated pilot reported scanning through the side window and windscreen and checking the multi-function display for an ADS-B traffic target. No traffic target was displayed, and neither Cessna pilot visually acquired the Swift before impact (see figures 6 and 7). Figure 6. Video footage showing the final Swift communication. Figure 7. Video footage showing the final Cessna communication. The physical evidence was consistent with the high-winged Cessna being behind and below the low-winged Swift (the Swift ahead and slightly above the Cessna). This relative position would have placed the Cessna in or near the Swift pilot’s aft blind area. The available evidence did not establish if the Swift pilot had an effective opportunity to visually acquire the Cessna before impact. From the perspective of the Cessna pilots, the Swift would have been ahead and slightly above the airplane during the final seconds. The Cessna was climbing after takeoff, and the Swift likely presented limited relative motion during the closing sequence. The evidence was consistent with neither pilot effectively acquiring the other airplane in time to avoid the collision.