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Omaha, NE
THE PLT RPRTD THAT WHEN THE ACFT WAS AT APRX 150' TO 200' AGL ON FINAL APCH, THE ENG LOST PWR & WOULD NOT RESTART. UNABLE TO RCH THE RWY, HE LNDD ABOUT 50' SHORT ON SOFT TRRN, WHERE THE GEAR COLLAPSED & THE ACFT WAS DMGD. ONLY ABOUT 12 OUNCES OF FUEL WAS REMAINING IN THE LEFT TANK, BUT 13 GAL WAS FND IN THE RGT TANK. DRG POST-ACDNT CHECKS, 3 GAL OF FUEL WAS ADDED TO THE LEFT TANK. HOWEVER, THE ENG WOULD NOT START IRREGARDLESS OF THE FUEL SELECTOR PSN. WHEN AN INDEPENDENT FUEL SOURCE WAS CONNECTED TO THE INLET FUEL LINE, THE ENG STARTED & OPERATED NORMALLY. HOWEVER, WHEN THE ENG WAS RECONNECTED TO THE ACFT FUEL SYS, IT RAN ONLY BRIEFLY & WOULD NOT RESTART, EVEN THOUGH FUEL IN THE TANKS EXCEEDED THE UNUSABLE LVL OF 1.3 GAL/TANK. A TEST OF THE BOOST PUMP SHOWED THAT AT 23 PSI, ITS FLOW RATE WAS 9 GPH; THE PUMP SPECIFICATION WAS FOR 35 GPH AT 23 PSI.
THE PLT RPRTD THAT WHEN THE ACFT WAS AT APRX 150' TO 200' AGL ON FINAL APCH, THE ENG LOST PWR & WOULD NOT RESTART. UNABLE TO RCH THE RWY, HE LNDD ABOUT 50' SHORT ON SOFT TRRN, WHERE THE GEAR COLLAPSED & THE ACFT WAS DMGD. ONLY ABOUT 12 OUNCES OF FUEL WAS REMAINING IN THE LEFT TANK, BUT 13 GAL WAS FND IN THE RGT TANK. DRG POST-ACDNT CHECKS, 3 GAL OF FUEL WAS ADDED TO THE LEFT TANK. HOWEVER, THE ENG WOULD NOT START IRREGARDLESS OF THE FUEL SELECTOR PSN. WHEN AN INDEPENDENT FUEL SOURCE WAS CONNECTED TO THE INLET FUEL LINE, THE ENG STARTED & OPERATED NORMALLY. HOWEVER, WHEN THE ENG WAS RECONNECTED TO THE ACFT FUEL SYS, IT RAN ONLY BRIEFLY & WOULD NOT RESTART, EVEN THOUGH FUEL IN THE TANKS EXCEEDED THE UNUSABLE LVL OF 1.3 GAL/TANK. A TEST OF THE BOOST PUMP SHOWED THAT AT 23 PSI, ITS FLOW RATE WAS 9 GPH; THE PUMP SPECIFICATION WAS FOR 35 GPH AT 23 PSI.