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May 12, 2021 · Aerospatiale AS350 B2 Ecureuil · N841BP

Yukon, OK

Overview

Report Status
Final with probable cause
Event Type
Accident
Date
May 12, 2021
Injury Outcomes
No injuries (2 uninjured)
Location
Yukon, OK
Aircraft
Aerospatiale AS350 B2 Ecureuil (1987)
Tail Number
N841BP
Operator
Customs Border and Protection
Injuries
None
Aircraft Damage
Destroyed
NTSB Number
CEN21LA216

The pilot receiving instruction (pilot) and the flight instructor were conducting a training flight in the helicopter. They performed several simulated emergencies, each of which required the helicopter’s hydraulic system to be turned off and then turned back on at the conclusion of the procedure. The hydraulic system was turned off and on using the hydraulic cut-off switch, an unguarded push-button switch mounted on the end of the pilot’s collective stick. After completing the emergency procedures, the pilot performed four quick stop maneuvers. The flight instructor reported that on the last quick stop, the helicopter slowed normally but then started a left yaw about 25 ft above ground level. The pilot noted the left yaw and attempted to correct it, but his pedal inputs did not stop the yaw. As the pilot tightened his grip on the collective, the hydraulic system turned off, likely due to the pilot inadvertently pressing the hydraulic cut-off switch, and the left yaw rapidly increased to a left spin. According to the flight instructor, the control loads “instantly became excessive,” and he noticed the hydraulic light on the caution warning panel was illuminated. The pilot intentionally pressed the hydraulic cut-off switch a total of three times, but hydraulic pressure was never restored. The flight instructor told the pilot that he was taking control of the helicopter. However, the pilot did not relinquish control. The flight instructor attempted to regain control of the helicopter but was unable to overcome the high control loads. The helicopter continued to spin, impacted the ground, rolled over, and came to rest on its right side. A postimpact fire consumed most of the helicopter. Although examination of the helicopter was limited due to fire damage, no preimpact abnormalities were identified with helicopter’s airframe and engine. The US Customs and Border Protection Air and Marine Operations Division reported that the agency’s selection process for the Air Interdiction Agent Program failed to properly identify that the pilot was not qualified for the program. Because the pilot did not have the qualifications and experience required for the Air Interdiction Agent Program, he did not have the prerequisite skill necessary to critically assess the situation given by the flight instructor. This resulted in the pilot applying improper corrective actions and failing to relinquish control of the helicopter to the flight instructor when directed, which contributed the accident.

NTSB Probable Cause

The pilot receiving instruction’s untimely and unidentified inadvertent activation of the hydraulic cut-off switch, which turned off the hydraulic system while the helicopter was at slow airspeed followed by a rapid power increase, which resulted in a loss of control. Contributing was the pilot’s failure to relinquish control of the helicopter to the flight instructor when directed.

Full Narrative

On May 12, 2021, about 1530 central daylight time, an Aerospatiale (Airbus) AS350 B2 helicopter, N841BP, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Yukon, Oklahoma. The pilot receiving instruction and the flight instructor were not injured. The helicopter was operated as a 14 CFR Part 91 public aircraft instructional flight. According to the flight crew, the pilot receiving instruction (pilot) was enrolled in the US Customs and Border Protection Initial Pilot Certification course for the AS350 B2. The flight departed the Will Rogers International Airport (KOKC) and proceeded to the Clarence Page Municipal Airport (KRCE) to conduct training maneuvers. After arrival at KRCE, the flight crew conducted several approaches to the airport including confined area and pinnacle approaches. They then conducted several simulated emergencies, each of which required the helicopter’s hydraulic system to be turned off and then turned back on at the conclusion of the procedure. The hydraulic system was turned off and on using the hydraulic cut-off switch, an unguarded push-button switch mounted on the end of the pilot’s collective stick. After the simulated emergencies, the flight crew proceeded to conduct a series of “quick stops.” After the third quick stop, the pilot heard a radio call indicating an airplane was on final approach to land on the runway they were using, and the flight instructor indicated that they would clear the runway. The pilot added that he completed a final quick stop and immediately entered a climbing left turn. The pilot stated that in the turn, he noticed the helicopter yawing left, and his pedal inputs were unable to correct the yaw. When the pilot adjusted his grip on the collective, he felt the hydraulic cut-off button with his thumb as he prepared to reduce collective. As he tightened his grip on the collective, “the hydraulics came offline aggravating the left yaw into a hard left spin.” The controls were stiff, and the flight instructor told him to turn the hydraulics back on. The pilot “intentionally pressed the [hydraulic cut-off] button but felt no effect.” He pressed the button a second time, but the hydraulic light on the caution warning panel remained illuminated, so he pressed the button a third time. The flight instructor reported that on the last quick stop, the helicopter slowed normally but then started a left yaw about 25 ft above ground level. After the helicopter yawed about 30° left of centerline, he pushed forward on the cyclic to gain airspeed. The flight instructor stated that “as the aircraft was recovering, the control loads instantly became excessive,” and he noticed the hydraulic light on the caution warning panel was illuminated. He told the pilot to turn on the hydraulics; however, the hydraulic pressure was never restored. The flight instructor told the pilot that he was taking control of the helicopter. However, the pilot did not relinquish control. The flight instructor attempted to regain control of the helicopter but was unable to overcome the high control loads. The helicopter continued to spin, impacted the ground in a nose-down attitude, rolled over, and came to rest on its right side. Both occupants were able to exit the helicopter before a postimpact fire consumed most of the helicopter. Examination of the helicopter was limited by the postimpact fire; however, no preimpact abnormalities were identified with helicopter’s airframe and engine. The US Customs and Border Protection Air and Marine Operations Division reported that the agency’s selection process for the Air Interdiction Agent Program failed to properly identify that the pilot was not qualified for the program.

Flight

Event TypeAccident
Event Time15:30 CDT
Nearest AirportClarence Page Municipal (1nm)
Flight Plan FiledNone
Aircraft FireGrd
Aircraft ExplosionNo

Aircraft

AircraftAerospatiale AS350 B2 Ecureuil
Tail NumberN841BP
Aircraft CategoryHeli
DamageDestroyed
OperatorCustoms Border and Protection
Engines1
Engine TypeTurboshaft
Engine DetailsTurbomeca · Arriel 1D1 · Turboshaft
Seats6

People & Injuries

Injury SummaryNo injuries (2 uninjured)
Fatal0
Serious0
Minor0
Uninjured2
Total2
Crew 1Age 45 · Second Class · None
Crew 2Age 40 · Second Class · None

Conditions

ConditionsVMC
LightDaylight
Wind20° @ 9 kt
Visibility10 sm
CeilingOvercast 6000 ft
Temperature / Dew Point64 F / 50
Altimeter30.29 inHg
Observation Time16:15
Weather SourceWFAC

Appendix: Source Data